The Euro by Ed Stevens
T he primary job of the modern central
bank is to manufacture money. In Janu-
ary 1999, the new European Central
Bank (ECB) began manufacturing a new
money—the euro—by taking over the
operations of 11 European nations’
monetary systems. The symbol for the
euro isn, just as $ is the symbol for the
dollar. By 2002, the euro will have
replaced entirely the existing currencies
of the 11 participating nations.1
A common currency is expected to bring
important benefits to the participants.
Politically, many see it as a powerful
next step toward a more complete Euro-
pean political union. Economically, it
should raise the standard of living of
Europeans over time by eliminating cur-
rency conversion costs and facilitating
price comparisons, thereby removing the
last major barrier to a common European
market in goods, services, and finance. 
Conversion to a new currency is a prodi-
gious technical feat: Every type font,
schoolbook, cash register, price tag, and
advertising display requires some alter-
ation; so do the mental arithmetic of
hundreds of millions of people and the
software of computers around the world.
Bookkeeping, pricing, bank accounts,
and payments in each of the 11 nations
will employ both the old national cur-
rency and the euro for a three-year tran-
sition period.2  After that, everything is
to be denominated in the euro, including
ECB coins and notes, although each
national central bank (NCB) may
include a national identifier on the euro
notes it issues.3
This Commentary outlines ECB institu-
tions and operations, comparing them to
those of the Federal Reserve where
instructive, and provides a brief intro-
duction to some of the political economy
issues facing the new central banking
arrangement. Merging the currencies of
independent nations is a rare political
event. In this case, the merger involves
both short- and long-term costs. Both the
politics and the economics have pro-
voked lively debate about how success-
ful and durable this new venture will be. 
n n   The Institution4
The ECB is the centerpiece of the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks (ESCB),
which includes the central banks of the
15 signatories to the treaty that estab-
lished the European Community. Four of
the 15 will not participate in manufactur-
ing euros, at least initially. Denmark,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom are
holding off, while Greece has yet to
meet the initial economic criteria for par-
ticipation. The 11 participating NCBs
will continue to exist, performing the
functions—payment system, fiscal
agent, and regulation/supervision—for
which they already were responsible
within their respective countries. The
difference is that they now engage in
monetary policy operations only when
and as instructed by the ECB. 
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the Governing Council, which includes
the governors of the participating NCBs
plus the six-member ECB Executive
Board appointed by the heads of state of
the member nations.5  Noteworthy fea-
tures of ECB monetary policy opera-
tions are the independence of its Gov-
erning Council from European Union
(EU) institutions and from the govern-
ments of the participating nations, its
method of implementing monetary pol-
icy, and the narrow focus of its role in
the financial system.
The statutory objective of the central
bank is “to maintain price stability.
Without prejudice to [that] objective [to]
support the general economic policies in
the Community…in accordance with
free competition, favoring an efficient
allocation of resources.” (Protocol, Arti-
cle 2). Independence from govern-
ment—analogous to the status of the
Federal Reserve System within the U.S.
government—has come to be regarded
as crucial to ensuring the credibility of a
monetary policy regime consistent with
price stability. Thus, “neither the ECB,
nor a national central bank, nor any
member of their decision-making bodies
shall seek or take instructions from
Community institutions or bodies, from
any government of a Member State or
from any other body. The Community
institutions and bodies and the govern-
ments of the Member States undertake to
respect this principle and not to seek to
influence the members of the decision-
making bodies of the ECB or of the na-
tional central banks in the performance
of their tasks” (Protocol, Article 7).
Moreover, the ECB and NCBs may not
purchase securities directly from, or
grant credit or overdrafts to, any “com-
munity institutions or bodies, central
governments, regional, local, or other
public authorities, other bodies governed
by public law, or public undertakings of
Member States” (Protocol, Article 21).
A central bank manufactures money by
purchasing securities or making loans
with its monetary liabilities. Changes in
the interest rate at which these policy
transactions take place have a funda-
mental influence on all other market
rates of interest. In the U.S., for exam-
ple, the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee conducts most policy operations in
the secondary market for U.S. govern-
ment securities. These transactions are
designed to control the federal funds
rate, the price of unsecured overnight
interbank loans. The ECB, however, has
no obvious counterpart to the U.S. gov-
ernment securities market in which to
conduct policy operations, lacking a
deep market for securities issued by the
EU itself. Consequently, the ECB will
operate in markets for the variety of gov-
ernment and private debt (and occa-
sional equity) instruments it approves.6,7
The short-term interest rate at which the
ECB buys (or sells) approved assets 
(3 percent initially) is not its only means
of influencing market interest rates. Two
standing facilities offer NCB deposits
and loans at ECB-determined interest
rates. Credit institutions receive the
ECB-determined overnight deposit rate
(2 percent) on the required reserve and
voluntary deposits held at their NCB.
This acts as a floor under overnight mar-
ket loan rates, for lenders are unlikely to
lend at a lower rate so long as they (or
their banks) can earn the official rate.
Similarly, credit institutions can borrow
unlimited amounts from their NCBs on
the security of assets approved for open
market operations, but at a penalty rate
(4.5 percent). This rate acts as the ceiling
of the range in which the overnight inter-
est rate can move. Borrowers are un-
likely to pay more as long as competing
lenders with collateral can borrow from
the ECB at this rate.8
n n    Potential Benefits 
of the Common Currency
Participating nations expect to realize
both political and economic gains from
adopting the euro. Politically, for many
Europeans the new central bank repre-
sents another building block in a pan-
European nation. Undoubtedly, some
place such a high value on the political
benefits of a united Europe that they
would overlook any potential costs of
integration. 
Economic benefits are just as important,
but difficult to quantify. First, the price
discovery process will be more efficient
because a single currency allows direct
comparison of the stated prices of a prod-
uct everywhere in the euro area. Second,
a reduction in transaction costs can be
expected for the enormous volume of
international (yet intra-euro) trade. Un-
certainty about exchange rates for intra-
euro trade has been eliminated, along
with the costs of hedging exchange rate
risk in currency forward and futures mar-
kets. Also, currency conversion costs
have been eliminated. The cost of main-
taining transaction balances should de-
cline as agents substitute a single, pooled
euro account for multiple account bal-
ances formerly maintained in multiple
currencies. Offsetting transactions can
replace balances as a source of funds,
allowing agents to economize on cash
balances. 
Further benefits of the common currency
can be expected indirectly in response to
reduced transaction costs. Operating in a
single currency will eliminate the major
remaining barrier to the free flow of cap-
ital across the borders of the 11 nations.
Already there are indications of impend-
ing cross-border consolidations of na-
tional securities exchanges and credit
institutions. The resulting standardiza-
tion of financial institutions and prac-
tices may eliminate costs now hidden in
accepted differences among national
financial practices. Similarly, increased
activity in cross-border mergers and
acquisitions already suggests that econ-
omies of scale and scope from more ex-
tensive cross-border operations are
expected to reduce costs and improve
economic well-being.n n    Potential Costs
Converting from 11 nations’ monetary
systems to the euro requires substantial
one-time conversion costs. Planning for
the new institution began in July 1990.
Barriers to the free movement of capital
within the EU were removed in Stage
One of the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU). In 1994, Stage Two saw
the formation of the European Monetary
Institute (EMI) that worked out details
of the new central bank’s operations.
Moreover, “convergence criteria” were
imposed at this stage. Each nation had to
meet these criteria for admission to the
ESCB, so that the 11 would come
together in broadly similar economic cir-
cumstances. In this way, the impact of
the initial euro monetary policy relative
to the preceding policies of the national
central banks would be constrained.9
Convergence already has registered in
long-term interest rates (figure 1). Yield
spreads among the 11 euro nations for
10-year maturity securities were as great
as 600 basis points in December 1995.
They had converged to spreads of less
than 100 basis points by the end of 1997
and to 50 basis points by the end of Sep-
tember 1998. Already, securities market
services have developed euro-wide bond
yield indexes to replace currency-
specific indexes.
Until quite recently, convergence was
less visible at the short end of the yield
curve (figure 2). Commentators had
pointed to the difficult choice the ECB
would have to make in January, as evi-
denced by wide differences among
money market rates in the 11 euro
nations. Setting a low policy interest rate
would accommodate the slow economic
expansions taking place in low-inflation
countries like Germany, France, and Bel-
gium. Alternatively, so the story went,
setting a high rate would seem more
appropriate for countries with higher
inflation rates like Italy and Ireland,
where demand was being restrained by
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SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.high central bank policy rates. Some-
how, the ECB had to define a single pol-
icy that could not possibly suit each of
the 11 national economies. 
The purported difficulty of making this
choice was exaggerated, though, for two
reasons: First, the sheer size of the Ger-
man and French economies relative to
the other nine members meant that ini-
tial ECB policy would have to mirror
that of these two large nations.10  Sec-
ond, a successful monetary policy can-
not be expected to maintain identical
price levels in every town, city, and
nation within a single currency area.
Almost certainly, prices will rise more
rapidly in some areas and less rapidly in
other areas depending on the composi-
tion of the industrial base and demand
for products. The task of the European
Central Bank is to achieve an objective
for the measured inflation rate for the
entire 11-nation economy, a rate that
represents a weighted average of price
experience across many markets. 
This kind of averaging is no different
than it is in the single dollar-currency
area of the United States. The Fed-
eral Reserve seeks to maintain non-
inflationary growth of the nation’s
economy using open market operations
to control the federal funds rate.
Nationwide arbitrage maintains the
funds rate at a uniform level through-
out the nation. Within this policy
milieu, the measured inflation rate in
U.S. cities was 1.2 percent over the
past year. For individual cities, how-
ever, inflation rates ranged from 1.0
percent in the South to 1.5 percent in
the West (table 1). That is, a single
monetary policy was associated with
results for specific products and for the
cost of living in specific areas that
were distributed around a national
average. Recent inflation data for the
euro area show an average rate identi-
cal to that of U.S. cities; however, the
distribution of national rates is almost
five times wider than the distribution
around the U.S. city average. 
Introducing a common monetary policy
imposes an ongoing economic cost on
each participating nation. Until now,
individual NCBs could set overnight
policy interest rates different from—
and to some extent independently of—
one another. Those that were experienc-
ing cyclical softness in economic
conditions (like Germany) relative to
others that were not (like Ireland) could
ease monetary policy. Faster money
growth and lower interest rates could
stimulate internal and external demand
to offset whatever asymmetric eco-
nomic shock was depressing conditions
in one country relative to the other.
Henceforward, however, participating
nations cannot use monetary policy to
offset such independent, asymmetric
economic shocks. 
n n    Durability of Common
Monetary Policy
Forsaking independent monetary policy
may represent the biggest continuing
cost of the euro, but participating
national governments thoroughly under-
stand this fact. Those national govern-
ments apparently believe the efficiency
benefits of a single currency, as well as
the greater credibility of the ECB’s
commitment to price stability, will more
than offset this potential cost. However,
one of the major uncertainties about the
durability and success of the ECB is
participants’ behavior once this cost be-
comes real. That is, when the going gets
tough, will a participating nation
attempt to withdraw from the ECB or
use its political power to shift ECB
monetary policy toward its own macro-
economic interests at the expense of
euro area-wide price stability?11
The degree of convergence of long-term
interest rates among the 11 participating
nations suggests that this is not a perva-
sive concern (figure 1). After all, a com-
mon monetary policy does not leave
individual euro nations powerless to
ameliorate economic shocks. Adjust-
ments in fiscal policies—the taxing,
transfer, and spending programs of the
various nations—allow governments to
react independently to cushion shocks,
within certain constraints. On the other
hand, the ability to conduct independent
fiscal policy within the common cur-
rency could bring with it an incentive
for a nation’s government to overspend
or undertax and run out-sized deficits.
No inflation premium need appear as
long as the ECB were expected to main-
tain price stability in any case.
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Luxembourg 1.0 South 1.0
Finland 1.1 New England 1.1
EU-11 average 1.2 National average 1.2
Netherlands 1.4 Midwest 1.4




NOTE: Data are for the year ending September 1998.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and Eurostat.
TABLE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF INFLATION RATESSeveral factors could discourage this.
First, financial markets themselves can
discourage excessive debt by requiring
quality or risk premiums on securities
issued by nations whose ability to ser-
vice debt is less assured than other
nations. This may explain the remaining
yield spreads among the long-term debt
issues shown in figure 1. Moreover, EU
nations have adopted the Stability and
Growth Pact, by which they “undertake
to comply with the medium-term bud-
getary objective of positions close to
balance or in surplus” and to “correct
excessive deficits as quickly as possible
after their emergence.”12  Failing such
appropriate corrective action, the Coun-
cil of the EU has put a mechanism in
place for enforcement by a series of
monetary and political penalties. Fur-
ther, the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community includes a mechanism
for nations to provide fiscal assistance
to one another. All of these factors offer
venues for political maneuvering to
enforce budget discipline without neces-
sarily debasing the monetary policy
deliberations of the Governing Council.
n n    Conclusion
The creation of the euro represents a de-
termined effort by 11 nations to revolu-
tionize European monetary and finan-
cial systems. The diversity of the
national economies suggests that the
ECB may experience some strain in
substituting a single monetary policy of
the new currency for the independent
monetary policies of the nations in-
volved. The apparent loss of national
monetary policy independence, how-
ever, should be offset by gains from
lower transaction costs in intra-Euro-
pean trade and finance, as well as a freer
flow of capital among the 11 nations
that is likely to enrich all their citizens.
n n    Footnotes
1.  The currencies and monetary operations
being merged are the Austrian schilling, Bel-
gian/Luxembourg franc, Dutch guilder,
Finnish markka, French franc, German mark,
Irish pound, Italian lira, Portuguese escuda,
and Spanish peseta.
2.  Interbank payments among the 11 nations,
however, converted to the euro at the open-
ing of business in 1999. The 10 existing cur-
rencies were linked to each other at fixed
exchange rates announced in May 1998. The
value of the euro in other currencies was
determined when foreign exchange trading
began in 1999.
3. The 12 Federal Reserve Banks have done
this, too. Except for the most recently rede-
signed $100, $50, and $20 bills, each piece of
U.S. currency bears a seal with the name and
symbol of the issuing Reserve Bank.
4.  For a basic description of ECB monetary
policy institutions, see The Single Monetary
Policy in Stage Three, General Documenta-
tion on ESCB Monetary Policy Instruments
and Procedures. Frankfurt: European Central
Bank, September 1998. European Union leg-
islation governing the ESCB can be found in
Title VI, Chapter 2, Protocol 3 of the treaty,
available at http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/
treaties/ec/ectreaty.html.
5.  The Executive Council is an additional,
non-decision-making official body, in which
the Governing Council is joined by the heads
of the ESCB central banks that are not
participating in the ECB.
6.  The seigniorage (profit) on manufacturing
money can be significant, as a popular brand
like the dollar illustrates. The Federal
Reserve Banks paid $20.8 billion in surplus
earnings to the U.S. Treasury in 1997, mostly
from the earnings on assets financed by issu-
ing $494 billion in non-interest-bearing paper
currency and required and excess financial
institution deposits. In the case of the ECB,
credit institutions’ required and excess de-
posit balances held at NCBs will bear inter-
est, eliminating some of the potential profit
margin. However, non-interest-bearing cur-
rency can be expected to finance a large por-
tion of ECB assets. 
The danger of seigniorage lies in its poten-
tial incentive for over-issue and consequent
inflation. No ECB participant has a strong
direct profit incentive to seek over-issue. The
participating NCBs pool and distribute the
earnings of their monetary operations among
themselves in proportion to their holdings of
capital in the ECB (Protocol, Article 32).
7.  For a complete list of securities approved
for ECB monetary operations, see
http://www.ecb.int/.
8.  As a transitional measure, the Governing
Council set the initial marginal lending and
deposit rates at 3.25 percent and 2.75 per-
cent, respectively, for the period January
4–21, 1999.
9.  The principal convergence criteria for join-
ing the ESCB are that national central banks
be independent of their governments, to avoid
being used as sources of free deficit financ-
ing, and have maintained low inflation rates
to demonstrate their prudence in using that
independence. National governments must be
living within limits on deficit spending and
outstanding debt, to instill confidence in their
creditworthiness, and must have maintained
their exchange rate with other euro nations
within established bounds, to demonstrate the
credibility of their policies. 
10. This was pointed out by Wim
Duisenberg, president of the ECB: “[B]e-
cause the economic weighting of France
and Germany in the euro zone is high, it
would be appropriate for interest rates to
converge to a low point” (Irish Times, June
30, 1998).
11.  The relevant EU treaties contain no pro-
vision for the withdrawal of a participating
nation from the euro operation.
12. Resolution of the European Council on
the Stability and Growth Pact, Amsterdam,
June 17, 1997. Available at http://www.euro-
emu.co.uk/offdocs/amsterdam1.shtml.
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